Phling: The Philosophy & Linguistics Workgroup
The linguistics and philosophy working group is devoted to the discussion of contemporary issues that lie at the intersection of linguistics and philosophy. The group meets quarterly to discuss a pre-circulated paper written by a member of the working group. The workgroup is open to both faculty and graduate students.
For more information or to be placed on our mailing list, contact Matthew Mullins.
Principle Participants: Brady Clark (Linguistics), Carl Ehrett (Philosophy), Sandy Goldberg (Philosophy), Stefan Kaufmann (Linguistics), Cristina Lafont (Philosophy) , Axel Mueller (Philosophy), Matthew Mullins (Philosophy), Lance Rips (Psychology), Gregory Ward (Linguistics)
Winter 2008
Lance Rips,
Northwestern University, "Nets and Hooks: Bayes Net Theories of Counterfactual Conditionals"
Abstract: Bayes nets are representations of causal systems, developed in computer science and philosophy of science. Many cognitive psychologists have also come to view them as plausible mental representations or “mental maps” of the causal environment. One advantage claimed for Bayes nets is that they provide a natural account of the truth value of counterfactual conditionals, such as “If widget x were not moving, then gadget y would not work.” To evaluate such sentences, we fix the state of the antecedent (setting widget x to not moving) in a Bayes net and then determine whether the consequent (gadget y not working) is true in the resulting system. This talk reports experiments that compare the predictions of two recent Bayes-net proposals against people’s judgments of the truth of counterfactuals.
The meeting will take place on Friday, March 14th, at 4pm, in the Philosophy Seminar Room, Kresge 2-345.
Fall 2007
Mitchell S. Green,
University of Virginia, "How Speech Acts Express Psychological States"
Abstract: One oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character: Assertion expresses belief,
apology regret, promise intention. Yet expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a
form of showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the sincerity condition of
the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act show a speaker’s state of thought or feeling? To
answer this question I consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them is
suited to help us answer our question. I also argue that concepts from the evolutionary biology of
communication provide one source of insight into how speech acts enable one to show, and
thereby express, a psychological state. The reading will be circulated to those on the mailing list two weeks prior to our meeting.
The meeting will take place on Friday, December 7th, at 4pm, in the Philosophy Seminar Room, Kresge 2-345.
