07/08 Philosophy & Linguistics Workgroup Meetings
The philosophy and linguistics working group is devoted to the discussion of contemporary issues that lie at the intersection of linguistics and philosophy. The group meets quarterly to discuss a pre-circulated paper or research developed by a member of the working group. The workgroup is open to both faculty and graduate students.
Spring 2008
Gregory Ward (Linguistics) and Ryan Doran (Philosophy), "Distinguishing WHAT IS SAID from WHAT IS IMPLICATED within a Gricean Framework”
Abstract: Grice’s work on conversational implicature distinguishes between what is said by an utterance and what is implicated; the former corresponding to truth conditional meaning and the later being additional pragmatically communicated meaning that is not part of truth conditions. Recent theoretical work on implicature has argued that many of Grice’s generalized conversational implicatures actually intrude upon truth-conditional meaning, and should thus be classified as part of what is said. In the first of two experiments, we seek to develop a new paradigm for assessing whether speakers incorporate GCIs into the truth-conditional meaning of utterances. The findings of this experiment revealed a continuum across different GCI types, with some types more likely than others to be treated as impacting truth conditions. In a follow-up experiment, we investigated possible factors that affect whether scalar implicatures are incorporated into truth conditions and found that the salience of alternative scale values influenced whether speakers were more likely to judge scalar implicatures as part of truth-conditional meaning. The results of these two experiments are not predicted by current theories of implicature and suggest a need for a more nuanced account of the relationship between saying and implicating.
Research team: Gregory Ward, Ryan Doran, Rachel Baker, Matthew Berends, Alex Djalali, Meredith Larson, and Yaron McNabb
The meeting will take place on Friday, May 30th, at 4pm, in the Philosophy Seminar Room, Kresge 2-345.
Winter 2008
Lance Rips, Northwestern University, "Nets and Hooks: Bayes Net Theories of Counterfactual Conditionals"
Abstract: Bayes nets are representations of causal systems, developed in computer science and philosophy of science. Many cognitive psychologists have also come to view them as plausible mental representations or “mental maps” of the causal environment. One advantage claimed for Bayes nets is that they provide a natural account of the truth value of counterfactual conditionals, such as “If widget x were not moving, then gadget y would not work.” To evaluate such sentences, we fix the state of the antecedent (setting widget x to not moving) in a Bayes net and then determine whether the consequent (gadget y not working) is true in the resulting system. This talk reports experiments that compare the predictions of two recent Bayes-net proposals against people’s judgments of the truth of counterfactuals.
The meeting will take place on Friday, March 14th, at 4pm, in the Philosophy Seminar Room, Kresge 2-345.
Fall 2007
Mitchell S. Green,
University of Virginia, "How Speech Acts Express Psychological States"
Abstract: One
oft-cited feature of speech acts is their expressive character:
Assertion expresses belief, apology regret, promise intention. Yet
expression, or at least sincere expression, is as I argue a form of
showing: A sincere expression shows whatever is the state that is the
sincerity condition of the expressive act. How, then, can a speech act
show a speaker’s state of thought or feeling? To answer this question I
consider three varieties of showing, and argue that only one of them is
suited to help us answer our question. I also argue that concepts from
the evolutionary biology of communication provide one source of insight
into how speech acts enable one to show, and thereby express, a
psychological state. The reading will be circulated to those on the
mailing list two weeks prior to our meeting.
