08/09 Philosophy & Linguistics Workgroup Meetings
The philosophy and linguistics working group is devoted to the discussion of contemporary issues that lie at the intersection of linguistics and philosophy. The group meets quarterly to discuss a pre-circulated paper or research developed by a member of the working group. The workgroup is open to both faculty and graduate students.
Fall 2009
Date: October 2, 2009
Title: Articles, Particles, Syntax
Author: Lee Goldsmith
Institution: Northwestern University
Time: 4:00 P.M.
Location: Kresge 2-345
Abstract: This paper contends that the definite article “the” and the indefinite article “a” do not contain any semantic content. They only serve a syntactic func- tion, as particles in other languages do, and any meaning associated with them is inferred pragmatically. This contention, which is called in the paper the “syntactic hypothesis,” is arrived at by observing an instability in the recent unified semantical accounts of the articles. These accounts jettison the uniqueness of the definite article and the non-uniqueness of the indefinite article into the pragmatics, yet retain the ex- istential quantifier purportedly contributed by both articles in the semantics. These accounts are unstable because they fail to apply rigorously their own principle for distinguishing between what is pragmatic and what is semantic. A rigorous applica- tion leads to jettisoning the existential quantifier as well. The syntactic hypothesis, however, renews an old Russellian worry about descriptions without referents. The paper concludes by alleviating this worry and even offers an explanation for the debate between Russellians and Strawsonians over the truth-value gap.
Date: October 23, 2009
Title: TBA
Author: Tim Sundell
Time: 4:00 P.M.
Location: Kresge 2-345
Institution: Northwestern University
Spring 2009
Chris Kennedy, University of Chicago, "On Averaging"
Abstract:(joint work with Jason Stanley)
This talk investigates the semantics of sentences that express numerical averages, such as (1)-(3).
- Although we did not measure this in our study, I can say from other work the average German sees his doctor 13 times a year, the average Swiss sees his doctor 7.5 times a year and the average Briton 3.5 times. (British National Corpus)
- Another study, by British researchers, stated that on average, men had 12.7 heterosexual partners in their lifetimes and women had 6.5. (New York Times, 8.12.07)
- NYU has reported that the 53 teens have lost an average of half of their excess weight over the past year, and that's truly excellent, considering that their average weight was 297 pounds at the beginning! (July 7, 2007 post to www.fitnessblogonline.com)
We begin with a discussion of the use of 'average' in definite descriptions, as in (1). Such uses have been argued by Chomsky, Hornstein and others to provide an argument against the hypothesis that natural language semantics includes a reference relation mapping words to objects in the world, while metaphysicians such as Joseph Melia and Stephen Yablo have used them to provide evidence that apparent singular reference need not be taken as ontologically committing. We show that such conclusions are unjustified by developing a fully general compositional analysis in which averaging constructions like those in (1)-(3) (and a few others) involve truth conditions that are about amounts rather than individuals and are derived using interpretive operations that are independently necessary for other, related constructions, such as comparatives and prenominal 'same'/'different'. In particular, our analysis makes crucial use of the operation that Barker (2008) dubs 'parasitic scope', which allows for the possibility that the function created by abstracting over the base position of a scope-taking element may compose with a third expression, rather than with the scope-taking element itself, as is normally the case. Finally, we discuss more general implications of our analysis for the semantics of number terms and plurals.
The meeting will take place on Friday, May 22nd, at 4pm, location, University Hall 102.
Winter 2009
Itamar Francez, University of Chicago, "Existentials, Predication and Modification"
Abstract: This paper offers a new semantic theory of existentials (sentences of the form There be NPpivot XPcoda) in which pivots are (second order) predicates and codas are modifiers. The theory retains the analysis of pivots as denoting generalized quantifiers (Barwise and Cooper 1981; Keenan 1987), but departs from previous analyses in analyzing codas as contextual modifiers on a par with temporal/locative frame adverbials. Existing analyses universally assume that pivots are arguments of some predicate, and that codas are main or secondary predicates. It is shown that these analyses cannot account for the behavior of codas with quantifiers and for the interaction of multiple codas, both of which receive a simple treatment on the proposed theory. The assimilation of codas to frame adverbials explains several semantic properties which have not been analyzed in the semantic literature, and that distinguish existentials from their copular counterparts. Furthermore, it highlights important properties of the semantics of modification and its relation to predication
The meeting will take place on Thursday, March 19th, at 4pm, location, Kresge 2-410.
Carl Ehrett (Philosophy), "Vagueness and the 'Factuality' of Semantics"
Abstract: The epistemicist solution to the problem of vagueness can seem wildly optimistic. Epistemicism holds that there is a precise but unknowable boundary separating the bald from the nonbald, the rich from the nonrich, and so on. Where we stumble or hesitate in our judgments, unsure of whether a particular hairscape counts as bald or not, epistemicism holds that there is some (perhaps undiscoverable) fact of the matter. Detractors of epistemicism complain that the epistemicist cannot provide a satisfactory account of how it is that our coarse, inconsistent usage of 'bald' could possibly determine a particular, absolutely precise boundary for that term. I call this the precision problem for epistemicism. I argue that the nature of the precision problem has been misunderstood. A proper understanding of the source of the precision problem shows it to be not merely a problem about how a term manages to acquire a precise semantic boundary; the problem is rather that of explaining how a term manages to acquire any particular semantic content at all. So understood, the problem reasserts itself as a problem for any view that takes a vague utterance to have semantic content. Thus the precision problem is indeed a problem forepistemicists, but not a problem for them qua epistemicists; and it does not dis advantage epistemicism with respect to rival accounts of vagueness. I argue that to bring the precision problem to bear against epistemicism, any rival account must not only solve the precision problem, but must do so in a way unavailable to epistemicism. Since the precision problem is crucial to the case against epistemicism, an epistemicist solution seems to be the best available account of the problem of vagueness.
The meeting will take place on Friday, February 13th, at 4pm, in the Philosophy Seminar Room, Kresge 2-345.
Fall 2008
Michael Horton, University of Kentucky, "Alethic Functionalism and the Unity of Semantics"
Abstract: Alethic pluralism is the view that there is more than one property of truth and that such properties are discourse relative. Alethic functionalism, on the other hand, views truth as a multiply realizable property, the property of having a property that plays the truth-role. Although truth’s realizer properties may vary from discourse to discourse, the higher-order property is the only property of truth and is domain insensitive. In this paper I argue for two claims: first, if alethic pluralism is correct then a general semantic theory employing the notion of truth will be impossible for a language with sentences belonging to more than one discourse. Rather we will need a semantic theory for each discourse-specific fragment of a language. Second, given some plausible assumptions about property individuation, the same holds true of alethic functionalism. The latter claim is surprising since it is as a response to the standard problems facing alethic pluralism that the theory is supposed to shine. I conclude with some general remarks about where a truth theorist can go from here.
The meeting will take place on Friday, December 12th, at 4pm, in the Philosophy Seminar Room, Kresge 2-345.
Peter Ludlow (Philosophy), "Linguistic Data and Linguistic Intuitions/Judgments”
Abstract: The topic of data is an interesting one in any science, not least because we don't have a firm grasp on what it is that data is supposed to be, nor on what sort of role it is supposed to play in theorizing, or for that matter, whether there is a clear distinction between data gathering and theorizing. My goal in this paper will be to try and get clear on the nature of data in linguistic theorizing and closely consider one of the more controversial sources of data -- so-called "linguistic intuitions." I'll make the case that linguistic intuitions are best described as linguistic judgments and I'll make the case that for the most part they are reliable enough sources of data and in some cases are crucial for the conduct of linguistic investigation.
The meeting will take place on Friday, October 10th, at 1pm, at the McCormick Tribune Center, MTC 3-119
