

IMMEDIATE WARRANT, EPISTEMIC RESPONSIBILITY, AND MOOREAN DOGMATISM
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For Jim Pryor, with gratitude, in order to find out exactly where we disagree.

Abstract:

“Moorean Dogmatists” endorse a response to external world skepticism that many people find dissatisfying. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to immediate epistemic warrant isn’t enough to avoid standard arguments for skepticism about the external world.

“Moorean Dogmatism” about perceptual justification has recently gained prominence as a response to external world skepticism. At the same time, “Dogmatists” such as Jim Pryor appear to endorse forms of reasoning or argumentation that many people – both epistemologists and non-philosophers – find unattractive. It is not easy to locate the source of this dissatisfaction, but according to a plausible suggestion, it has something to do with what we reasonably expect of mature rational agents in the course of reasoning or epistemic deliberation. My goal in this paper is to begin to explore this suggestion. The rough idea that I will try to work out is a familiar one: that even if sensory experiences provide or constitute the kind of reasons or warrants that the Dogmatist claims, one cannot acceptably reason from them to conclusions about the world unless one already has epistemically satisfactory beliefs to the effect that one is not, e.g., a disembodied spirit being deceived by an evil demon. In working out this rough idea, I take as my inspiration a principle known as “the principle of inferential justification”:

In order to arrive at a justified belief that q on the basis of an inference from some premise p , one must have a justified belief to the effect that p supports q .

Elsewhere I have defended such principles from charges of incoherence or unsatisfiability, and I am inclined to think that something in this territory is correct, at least so far as mature adults are concerned, and can be derived from, or explained in terms of, the demands appropriately placed upon mature rational agents in the course of epistemic deliberation.ⁱ In this paper, I will propose and defend a related principle that applies to any case in which a rational agent explicitly bases a belief upon certain grounds in the course of conscious reasoning or epistemic deliberation. My first point will be that this principle is completely compatible with the “Dogmatist” insistence that sensory experience can provide immediate warrant for beliefs. As we will see however, this principle will enable an explanation of our distaste for the forms of reasoning apparently endorsed by “Dogmatist” views. A surprising result of this discussion will be that “Dogmatism” alone isn’t enough to avoid standard arguments for skepticism about the external world.

I. Immediate Warrant and the Demands of Epistemic Responsibility

Epistemic Warrant

For the purposes of this discussion, I am going to assume a certain theoretical framework: that there are states or conditions that are *warrants* for belief, and that we can sensibly ask about what it is in virtue of which these states or conditions are warrants.

I don't know whether, at the end of the day, I would want to accept this overall theoretical framework, let alone any position within it. But here I am simply going to assume this framework and work with a particular position within it. I will begin by articulating that position.

First, what is a warrant? A warrant to believe Q is a state or condition that can figure in an account of why Q is an epistemically appropriate or acceptable proposition to believe regardless of whether you actually believe Q. It *counts in favor* of your believing Q.

A truly ecumenical characterization of the notion of warrant would remain neutral on what sorts of states or conditions can constitute warrants. One issue here would concern the relation of warranting states or conditions to the subject's awareness. For instance, some theories hold that only states or conditions of which the subject is aware can constitute warrants. Others would allow that states or conditions of which the subject is not aware can constitute warrants. Process reliabilist views would be a case in point. Maybe there could be a plausible theory that holds that states of which the subject is not even in a position to become aware could be warrants.

Another issue here would concern the "location" of the warranting states or conditions. Must they be internal to the subject, in some relevant sense of "internal"?

I will not be truly ecumenical on these issues. I am going to make two assumptions: First, that warranting states or conditions must be states or conditions that are the sorts of things that subjects can become aware of (though not necessarily through introspection alone); second, that warrants are not wholly "internal," at least in the following regard – there can be real-world necessary conditions, entirely independent of

the subject's psychology or intrinsic physical states, for a state or condition's being a warrant. (At present I see no reason not to accept that mind-independent states or conditions can themselves constitute warrants, but nothing here turns on this.)

I will make one further assumption about the kinds of things that warrants are. I assume that warrants are the sorts of things that can play the role of *epistemic reasons* in an agent's deliberations about what to believe. That is to say, if an agent has a warrant to believe Q and is deliberating about whether to believe Q, that warrant will be the sort of thing that could play the role marked out by the "because..." clause when one judges, "I should/may believe that Q, because...". This is not to say that whenever one has a warrant to believe some proposition, one could use that warrant in this way; the claim is rather that warrants are things of a type that is suited to play this role. This requirement, as I mean to understand it, does not entail that the warrant must itself be a proposition or have propositional content. The warranting state or condition is what is picked out by the "because..." clause, and what is so picked out -- not the proposition by which we pick it out -- is the warrant. Or so I will assume for the purposes of this discussion.

Epistemic reasons are such because of their relation to truth: an epistemic reason in favor of a particular proposition supports, tells in favor of, or indicates the truth of that proposition. If warrants are the kinds of things that can play the role of epistemic reasons in an agent's deliberations about what to believe, then warrants support, tell in favor of, or indicate the truth of the propositions that they warrant believing. There are a variety of ways of interpreting this requirement. Here, I will assume that it involves a requirement for *real-world reliability*: the world has to be such that there is an appropriately reliable link between the warranting state or condition and the truth of the relevant beliefs. I

should emphasize that this requirement, if it is correct at all, is at most a *necessary* condition. There is a reliable link between any state or condition and the truth of my belief that two plus two equals four. But a great many of these states and conditions do not give me warrant for this mathematical belief and do not constitute reasons in its favor.

Certain brands of “internalism” about warrant (including Pryor’s, I think) will reject this construal of the requirement that warrant be “truth-conducive.” I favor a real-world reliability requirement because such a requirement seems to be strongly suggested by our actual epistemic practice. Suppose that someone is brought up to predict the outcomes of battles by reading tea leaves, a method endorsed by everyone in his community. Neither he nor anyone in his community is in a position to understand the considerations that show that there is no reliable connection between the arrangement of leaves in tea cups and the outcomes of battles. If such a person infers from considerations about tea leaves that a battle will turn out a certain way, we will certainly think that the person has behaved blamelessly; he has done everything that can reasonably be demanded of him in order to form a true belief. But at the same time, we will feel that there is a shortcoming here. We might say, “His training and circumstances are unfortunate. He really shouldn’t believe on the basis of considerations about tea leaves that the battle will turn out a certain way; no one should. Regardless of what he thinks, however blamelessly, considerations about the arrangement of tea leaves don’t actually provide any reason to believe anything at all about the outcomes of battles.” When we make judgments like this, what seems to be motivating us is the thought that there is not the right sort of connection between arrangements of tea leaves and the outcomes of battles: the one is not a reliable indicator of the other.

I will understand this reliability requirement in a particular way, namely as not requiring a tight *de facto* general statistical correlation. Instead, the reliable link in question needs hold only *ceteris paribus*. It could so happen that in most actual instances in which the warranting state or condition actually occurs, things are not equal, so that there is not a tight general statistical correlation. What is required is just that *all else equal*, if the warranting state or condition occurs, then the proposition at issue will be (highly likely to be) true.

On this understanding of the matter, warrants will be relative to real-world conditions in two ways. First, real-world conditions will have to be such that the relevant *ceteris paribus* reliable link holds at all. I will use the term *enabling conditions* for the real-world conditions that ensure that the relevant *ceteris paribus* reliable link obtains, and I will call conditions that would prevent such a *ceteris paribus* link *disabling conditions*. To take a simple example, consider the relation between the consideration that I've just taken some ibuprofen and the belief that my headache will soon go away. The former supports the latter, but only because an enabling condition is met: ibuprofen interacts with human physiology in a way that removes pain. It's not doing so – or the underlying physiological facts in virtue of which it does not do so – would be a *disabling condition* for this reasons-relation.

Real-world conditions will be relevant in a second way as well. Even when the enabling conditions for them are met, warrants will often be *defeasible*: if all else is not equal, then the warranting state or condition may not – all things considered – actually render the proposition at issue at all likely to be true. In this way, *facts in the world* can be defeaters in relation to a particular warrant – their obtaining can undercut or defeat the

support the warranting state or condition would otherwise provide to the proposition at issue.ⁱⁱ Given the defeasibility structure of warrants and the fact that warrants can point in different directions, we can thus distinguish between what one has *prima facie* warrant to believe and what one has *all-in* warrant to believe: what one has *prima facie* warrant to believe is what is supported by the warranting state or condition merely as such given the way the world works; what one has *all-in* warrant to believe is determined in part by what is the case in the total relevant circumstances.ⁱⁱⁱ

We can distinguish *immediate* from *mediate* warrants in the following way. An *immediate warrant* is a state or condition whose status as a warrant is not constituted by one's having warrant to believe any other propositions, in the following sense: an adequate account of *what makes it the warrant that it is for believing that proposition* would not need to say anything about one's having warrant to believe any other propositions. (That requirement's satisfaction is compatible with its being the case that things appealed to in that account *are* warrants to believe other propositions. All that matters is that their *being* warrants to believe other propositions isn't part of the account of what makes *this* state or condition the warrant that it is.^{iv} Epistemologists have debated whether any warrants are immediate in this sense. A number of candidates have been put forward as constituting immediate warrants, including perceptual states and introspectible states such as pains and headaches. For the purposes of this discussion, I will grant that there are immediate warrants. My question is what exactly would follow if there were.

Even if perceptual states do constitute immediate warrants to believe certain propositions, they do not constitute immediate warrants to believe every proposition with whose truth they are reliably linked. My perceptual experience of my hands does not, all

by itself, give me warrant to believe that two plus two equals four. So some limitation is needed. A natural limitation, accepted by most theorists who accept immediate perceptual warrant at all, is to say that an experiential state cannot provide you with immediate warrant to believe anything other than what it “directly tells you”, which is often interpreted in terms of the content of the experiential state itself [Pryor, others?]. For the purposes of this discussion, I will assume this limitation on immediate perceptual warrant. On this approach, then, your experience might well give you immediate warrant to believe that there are two hands in front of you, provided that there is the right sort of link between experiences of the relevant sort and the truth. But your experience will not give you immediate reason to believe that your experience is reliable, that you are not a brain in a vat, or that you are not being deceived by an evil demon, even if there is an appropriate reliable connection between your experiential states and the truth of these claims.

One last point about the notion of epistemic warrant. A person might have a warrant to believe a particular proposition, believe that proposition, and yet not hold that belief in a reasonable, epistemically appropriate, or epistemically satisfactory way. For instance, the person might base the belief on some other, bad reason, or the person might not hold the belief on the basis of any epistemic reason at all, but instead out of wishful thinking. This is just one sort of example; a variety of things can go wrong in such a way that the person’s actual belief is not fully epistemically satisfactory even though the person *has a warrant* for the believed proposition and so is warranted in believing it. To give a label to the status that is lacking in all such cases, I will say that a person is *doxastically justified* if the person not only has a warrant for the belief, but also holds the

belief in a way that is fully epistemically satisfactory (beyond epistemic criticism). A variety of conditions will have to be met in order for a person to be *doxastically justified* regarding a particular belief on a particular occasion. According to many theories, the person will not only have to have a warrant, but also *hold that belief on the basis of that warrant*. A variety of conditions will have to be met in order for that requirement to be met. The point that I want to emphasize here is that we have to distinguish these further conditions that must be met in order for a person to be *doxastically justified* from the conditions that must be met in order for the person to have warrant. It would be a mistake to think that the factors involved in these further conditions must be factors that constitute the person's having warrant to hold the belief.

Some "Responsibilist" Proposals

I turn now to conditions on doxastic justification that might be thought to arise from considerations about epistemic responsibility.

A person can have a warrant for a particular belief and yet not recognize the warranting condition or state as such. Very young children are generally in this situation, and mature adults can be in it as well. Mature adults differ from very young children in an important respect, however: they are often in a position to recognize a particular state or condition as telling in favor of the truth of a particular belief. Mature adults – and especially those who have been trained to think critically – also differ from children in another important respect: they are capable of forming and modifying their beliefs in response to their evaluations of reasons in the course of explicit, conscious deliberation.

Different abilities warrant different demands.^v The above differences consequently open up the possibility of modes of epistemic evaluation that are not applicable to children and that go beyond the simple question of whether a person has warrant to hold a particular belief. In particular, they open up the possibility of asking whether a particular person proceeded *responsibly* in the deliberative formation of a particular belief and whether a particular belief – regardless of whether or not formed through explicit deliberation – is held in an *epistemically responsible way*. For if someone is capable of directly forming or modifying a mental state or attitude through deliberation, then it is something for which she is properly held responsible, and about which it can be asked whether she has conducted – and is conducting – herself well or poorly. These matters are properly regarded as *epistemic*, insofar as deliberation is aimed at forming, or correcting, beliefs in a way that accords with the truth.

Questions about whether a particular belief is responsibly held can involve a variety of issues. But one central issue for such evaluations is how matters look *from the perspective of the person whose belief it is*, and in particular how matters look to the person regarding reasons for and against the belief. It is arguable – though disputed – that a mature adult cannot hold a belief responsibly unless she treats (or is prepared to treat) something as a good reason for it. Such a requirement would clearly be too strong if it demanded that the person have explicitly highlighted something as a good reason for holding the belief; only certain dispositions of thought and response can reasonably be demanded (such as a disposition to reason from the relevant consideration, or to offer it as a reason when asked). Even so, it might be thought that such a requirement is too strong. But something weaker is hard to deny:

When in the course of explicit, conscious deliberation or reasoning one bases a belief that *p* upon a particular warranting state or condition *W*, that belief will not be formed or held responsibly unless one takes *W* to support (defeasibly to tell in favor of) the truth of *p*.

As before, it is surely too strong to require that the person have an explicit, conscious belief that *W* supports the truth of *p*. At most, what is required is that the person implicitly believe this, as manifested in dispositions of thought and response such as a willingness to treat the claim in question as a premise for reasoning, to assent to it if asked, etc.

Here is an argument for this requirement. To explicitly base a belief upon a particular state or condition is to link one's attitude to that state or condition in such a way that the acceptability of one's belief state stands or falls with the adequacy of that basis. It is in effect to say, "It is upon *this* that I stake my claim." Understanding the basing relation in this way, it is hard to see how someone could responsibly base a belief upon a particular state or condition in the course of conscious deliberation without taking that state or condition to tell in favor of the truth of the believed proposition. For one thing, to base the belief upon that state or condition is to take that state or condition as an epistemic reason, and that requires, as any mature believer recognizes, that the state or condition tell in favor of the truth of the proposition. For another thing, to base a belief upon a particular state or condition is precisely to treat it as something other than a hunch or guess, but rather as something *supported*. And to treat it that way is to take something to tell in favor of the truth of the proposition in question. The basic idea I want to endorse here is consequently this: if someone consciously and explicitly bases a belief upon a

particular warrant that will be little more than a *guess* from that person's point of view unless the person takes the warrant to tell in favor of the truth of the believed proposition. And if the belief is little more than a guess from that person's point of view, then it is not responsibly held. We quite appropriately expect more of mature believers.

The requirement that I have been discussing engenders further requirements. Consider some possible *disabling condition* \square whose obtaining would prevent the state or condition W from telling in favor of the truth of P, because if \square obtained, then there would not be the right sort of reliable linkage between the obtaining of W and the truth of P. Suppose that you base your belief that P upon W. As I've just argued, this requires you to believe that W tells in favor of the truth of P. And suppose that you recognize that \square 's obtaining would prevent W from telling in favor of the truth of P. Then, you are rationally required to believe also that \square does not obtain, at least if you consider the question. For given that you recognize the incompatibility between \square 's obtaining and W's telling in favor of the truth of P, requirements of consistency preclude you from endorsing both the claim that \square obtains and that W tells in favor of the truth of P, and they also preclude you from endorsing the claim that W tells in favor of the truth of P while suspending judgment or forming no opinion at all about whether \square obtains. So if you consider the question at all, you are rationally committed to endorsing the claim that \square does not obtain. Quite plausibly, if you failed to do so under such circumstances, your belief that P, based as it is upon W, would be rendered irresponsible: either from your own point of view it would be little more than a guess, or it would be held in a way that involves you in a manifest inconsistency. Consequently, the following additional requirement appears quite plausible:

When in the course of explicit, conscious deliberation or reasoning one bases a belief that P upon a particular warranting state or condition W, that belief will not be formed or held responsibly unless for each possible disabling condition Γ that one recognizes would prevent W from defeasibly telling in favor of the truth of P, one believes – if one considers the question at all – that it does not obtain.

To put it another way, this requirement can be stated as what has been called a “broad scope rational obligation” (Broome) or a requirement of structural rationality (Scanlon) (where brackets indicate the relevant scope):

If one is a mature rational agent, then epistemic responsibility demands that one must [if one explicitly and consciously bases P upon W in the course of deliberation, recognizes that Γ is a disabling condition for W in relation to P, and considers whether Γ obtains, then one believes that Γ does not obtain].

As this formulation brings out, the requirement imposes a structural requirement, based in considerations about responsibility, that one hold certain sorts of beliefs, given that one holds others in certain ways.

This requirement is supported by simple examples from our ordinary practice. Here’s one. Suppose that you consciously and explicitly base a belief that your headache will soon lift upon the consideration that you just took an ibuprofen. You recognize that if ibuprofen did not interact with human physiology in such a way as to remove pain, then the fact that you just took an ibuprofen would not tell in favor of the belief that your headache will soon lift. Suppose you are now asked: “What of the possibility that

human physiology is such that ibuprofen does not remove pain?” If you say, “Oh, I don’t have any opinion at all about whether that’s so or not, but still: my headache will soon lift because I just took an ibuprofen,” then – assuming all else is equal – your position is open to criticism. You are criticizable for holding your belief about your headache in the way that you do.

Here’s a second example. Suppose that you consciously base the belief that it is 2:15 PM on the fact that your watch reads 2:15PM. You of course recognize that if your watch had a malformed gear rendering it slow, then (all else equal) the fact that it reads 2:15 PM would not tell in favor of its being 2:15 PM. Suppose now that you are asked, “What of the possibility that your watch is slow because of a malformed gear?” If you say, “Oh, I don’t have any opinion at all about whether my watch is slow because of a malformed gear, but still: it’s 2:15 PM because that’s what my watch says,” then – assuming there isn’t anything unusual about the case – your belief about the time is open to criticism. You have failed to take into account something that you should take into account.

The requirement I’ve been discussing is quite narrow, in two respects. First, it pertains only to possible *disabling conditions*. Second, it is limited only to possible disabling conditions which one *explicitly considers in the course of deliberation*. Extensions of it are plausible in both respects. First, I find it quite plausible that the range of possible disabling conditions relevant to attributions of epistemic responsibility is not limited merely to the possibilities one explicitly considers in the course of deliberation or reasoning. For if one fails to believe that a possibility does not obtain which one recognizes would prevent W from telling favor of P, then one’s

epistemic position is arguably open to criticism if one goes ahead and bases one's belief that P on W, thereby taking W to tell in favor of P. At the very least, one has failed to put two and two together, and that can be as much a failure of epistemic responsibility as any other. For this reason, I am inclined to extend a requirement such as this to include all possible disabling conditions that one recognizes would prevent W from telling in favor of P (so long as it is understood, as elsewhere, that the requisite "beliefs" may be manifested in nothing more than dispositional states including such things as a willingness to treat the claim in question as a premise for reasoning, to assent to it if asked, etc.).

Second, similar requirements have some plausibility regarding possible external *defeaters* as well – particular possibilities whose obtaining would defeat a prima facie warrant. Suppose, for instance, that your visual experience is generally reliable in such a way that your experience as of P provides defeasible warrant for you to believe P. And suppose that you recognize that a trick of the light would defeat this warrant on a particular occasion. You now base a particular belief upon your visual experience. Under such circumstances, it would seem that you would be open to criticism if you replied to a challenge by saying, "The possibility that there was a trick of the light? I have no opinion at all about whether that's what happened." If you are going to rely on your vision, then it seems that you are open to criticism if you fail to believe that there was not a trick of the light.

Requirements of this latter sort would be readily explicable if something like the following were true:

When in the course of deliberation or reasoning one bases a belief that P upon a particular warranting state or condition W, one is thereby rationally committed to taking W to provide *all-in* warrant for P.

For if that were true, then the following would also be true, given the demands of rational consistency:

When in the course of deliberation or reasoning one bases a belief that P upon a particular warranting state or condition W, that belief will not be formed or held responsibly unless for each possible *defeating condition* that one recognizes would defeat the support W provides for P, one believes (if one considers the question at all) that it does not obtain.

However, it is not at all clear to me whether in basing a belief P upon a warranting state or condition W, one is thereby rationally committed to taking W to provide *all-in* support for P. Certain examples suggest that this requirement would be too strong. Here's one. Suppose that my trustworthy brother asks me to meet him for dinner at 6 PM. I believe that he will meet me at 6 PM because he has asked me to. I'm out all afternoon and don't have a cell phone, so I haven't checked my messages all afternoon. Must I, if I consider the possibility that he called and left a message on my machine announcing a change of plan, believe that this possibility does not obtain? If I don't believe this, do I thereby render my belief that he will meet me open to criticism? Our judgments about this sort of case are curiously indecisive, especially when we consider the case in the abstract without filling in every detail. Without much more detailed investigation of our practice, I would prefer not to put much weight on this sort of requirement, attractive though it can seem to be. I consequently want to acknowledge the possibility that requirements of this

sort may be correct, though perhaps only when further limited to certain possibilities in certain sorts of circumstances, but I will not assume any such requirements in my argument here.

The responsibilist requirements defended so far have demanded only that one *have* certain beliefs in order to responsibly hold certain other beliefs. However, it seems clear that if the beliefs demanded by these requirements are not themselves responsibly held, then the target beliefs will not be responsibly held either. For instance, suppose that I believe both that it is 2:15 PM because my watch says so and also that my watch is reliable. Suppose, however, that the latter belief flies in the face of lots and lots of evidence at my disposal. Then my belief that my watch is reliable is clearly open to epistemic criticism: I didn't proceed as I should have in relation to it. The same point will apply, all else equal, to my belief about the time, and it will apply because of my failing in relation to my belief about my watch's reliability.

In fact, an even stronger requirement is quite plausible. Suppose that I have no actual warrant for my belief that my watch is reliable. In that case, even if that belief is responsibly held, it will not be fully epistemically satisfactory. In the terminology I used previously, it will not be *doxastically justified*. But under these conditions, my belief that the time is 2:15, based as it is upon what my watch says, will also be open to epistemic criticism; it too will not be fully epistemically satisfactory. For instance, we might say, "Since you have no good reason to believe that your watch is reliable, you shouldn't believe that the time is 2:15 merely on the basis of what your watch says." I am consequently inclined to accept the following requirement:

When in the course of explicit, conscious deliberation or reasoning one bases a belief that P upon a particular warranting state or condition W, that belief will not be *doxastically justified* unless for each possible disabling condition \square that one recognizes would prevent W from defeasibly telling in favor of the truth of P, one believes – if one considers the question at all – that it does not obtain *and* this latter belief is *doxastically justified as well*.

My argument in the remainder of this paper will be based upon the assumption that this requirement is correct. As before, the additional belief may be only implicit or “dispositional,” like your current belief that the sun is more than 42, 798 miles from the earth. It may be manifested in nothing more than certain dispositions of thought and response.

One important aspect of this requirement deserves comment. This requirement is *not* an epistemic priority requirement, insofar as it makes no claim about the nature or structure of the warrant that one must have for the requisite doxastically justified belief(s). In particular, the requirement does not demand that one have an antecedent or independent warrant. The requirement simply states that if one has a certain sort of doxastically justified belief – explicitly based on certain grounds under certain sorts of conditions – then one also has to have certain other doxastically justified beliefs. It is a further question how the warrants for the latter beliefs might acceptably be related to the warrants for the former.

It is a commonplace in the epistemological literature to assume that “responsibilist” ideas of the sort sketched here force one to accept *higher-order*

requirements, that is, requirements demanding (justified) beliefs about one's beliefs and their justificatory status. Regardless of whether that is correct, it should be emphasized that the requirements I have sketched here are not higher-order. Rather, they require that one have epistemically acceptable *first-order* beliefs that certain things are or are not the case and that certain states or conditions indicate the truth of certain propositions.

Immediate Warrant and Immediate Doxastic Justification

It is perfectly possible to combine a commitment to the existence of immediate warrants and a commitment to the existence of "responsibilist" requirements of the sort sketched in the previous section. In many ways, the result would be an attractive view. It would allow one to accept the reliabilist idea that epistemically satisfactory beliefs must be appropriately related to truth even if they aren't in fact true. It would allow one to accept the "internalist" idea that for mature adults, at least, epistemic evaluation involves notions of epistemic responsibility and concerns, at least in part, how matters look from the agent's point of view. And it would allow one to do justice to the idea that there are some warrants, notably perceptual warrants, whose warranting power is not constituted, even in part, by one's having any warrant to believe anything else. Of course, to advocates of purely reliabilist or "externalist" views or of various "internalist" views, not to mention staunch anti-foundationalists about warrant, the result will look like nothing but misguided compromise at best and shotgun marriage at worst. To my mind, however, it's plausible that this reaction would miss significant insights. The resulting view arguably shows a way to connect our interest in epistemic warrant with our interest in how things look from the first-person standpoint of an epistemic deliberator. And it

would thus provide a way to understand how our interest in the first-person deliberative stance is connected with our interest in the acquisition of true beliefs. (Of course, the particular label, “doxastic justification,” is irrelevant here. The proposal is not intended as an “analysis” of some pre-theoretical concept or term in everyday usage. What would matter is that the package captures a bundle of epistemic desiderata that are of significance to us.)

The result is a view which holds that while there are immediate warrants – notably perceptual warrants – no belief deliberately based on such a warrant will be doxastically justified unless one also has certain other doxastically justified beliefs. And this will not merely be a necessary condition for the former belief’s being doxastically justified; it will be a *constitutive requirement*, insofar as one’s having those other doxastically justified beliefs is part of what makes it the case that the target belief is doxastically justified. According to such a view, then, it would be a serious mistake to confuse the notions of *immediate warrant* and *immediate doxastic justification*. An *immediately doxastically justified belief* is a belief whose status as doxastically justified does not constitutively depend upon one’s having any other doxastically justified beliefs. For all I have said here, there may be immediately doxastically justified beliefs, though it is possible – and I think arguable – that the considerations that motivate “responsibilist” requirements of the sort highlighted above will also motivate the denial of immediate doxastic justification. However this may be, though, on the compound view sketched here some beliefs will be ones for which one has an immediate warrant, and which are based on an immediate warrant, but whose status as doxastically justified constitutively depends upon one’s possession of some other doxastically justified beliefs. These beliefs

will accordingly be based on immediate warrants but will *not* be immediately justified. Immediate warrant and immediate doxastic justification are thus not merely notionally separable for a view along these lines; they are extensionally inequivalent.

II. “Moorean Dogmatism”

“Moorean Reasoning” and Immediate Warrant

Contemporary “Moorean Dogmatists” hold that there are *immediate perceptual warrants* for beliefs about the world outside of our own minds. So, for instance, some “Moorean Dogmatists” hold that the visual experience as of a hand gives one immediate prima facie warrant to believe that there is a hand. My question here is what exactly would follow from such a thesis when it is placed within the broader framework articulated in the previous section.

“Moorean Dogmatism” is generally aimed at providing a response to external world skepticism (Pryor, Huemer, others?). The idea is this. The form of skepticism at issue holds that no one is doxastically justified in believing anything about the world around them by means of the senses. The Moorean Dogmatist traces this skeptical claim to a commitment to a particular principle about *experiential warrant*:

In order to have an experiential warrant to believe anything about the world around one, one must have an independent warrant for believing such things as that one is not dreaming, not a brain in a vat, and not a disembodied spirit being given misleading hallucinatory experiences by an evil demon.

If this principle is correct, then we have no immediate experiential warrants for beliefs about the world outside of our own minds, since this principle holds that our possession of experiential warrants constitutively depends upon our having warrant to believe some other things. But of course this is precisely what the “Moorean Dogmatist” denies. The “Moorean Dogmatist” consequently attempts to avoid skepticism by rejecting this principle.

Despite rejecting this principle, the Moorean Dogmatist wants to allow that we can have warrant to believe such things as that we are not BIV’s and not disembodied spirits deceived by an evil demon. The Moorean Dogmatist’s suggestion is that we have *mediate* warrant to believe such things, warrant that stems from our *immediate* warrant to believe such things as that we have hands. The Moorean Dogmatist consequently represents the order of our warrants like this:

Visual experience of hands



I have a hand




I am not a disembodied spirit being deceived by an evil demon.

Notice that the claim so far is *not* a claim about what a person’s beliefs are based upon or may acceptably be based upon, nor is it a claim that a certain inference or course of reasoning would be reasonable or epistemically acceptable. The claim is simply one

about the relations amongst the warrants a person can have to believe particular propositions.

Standardly, however, Moorean Dogmatists go further and claim that this pattern of relations amongst warrants maps onto a fully reasonable pattern of argument or reasoning by which one could arrive at a doxastically justified belief that one is not a bodiless spirit under an evil demon's sway. Pryor, for instance, considers a course of reasoning which we can represent thus (MS, 4):



He urges that if one accepts that there is immediate perceptual warrant, then this reasoning “can be a way to acquire some warrant to believe Moore-3; and it can be reasonable to believe Moore-3 on the basis of it” (MS, 7). He consequently has spent much effort attempting to explain away the seeming unattractiveness of reasoning such Moore 1-3; on his view, it seems, the core thesis of Moorean Dogmatism – viz., that there are immediate perceptual warrants – would fall if such reasoning were always epistemically unacceptable.

This view is readily intelligible, given the Moorean Dogmatist's aspirations in relation to external world skepticism. The Moorean Dogmatist accepts a certain framework conception that has structured much epistemological theorizing in the Twentieth Century. According to this conception, if we are doxastically justified in

believing anything about the world around us, then we should be able to reconstruct how an (ideal) epistemic subject could – without assuming any claims about the external world at the outset – acceptably reason or deliberate her way to warranted conclusions about the world, thereby acquiring doxastically justified beliefs. The Moorean Dogmatist’s aspiration, then, is to explain how this could be possible, not just for beliefs such as that we have hands, but also for beliefs such as that we are not bodiless spirits being deceived by an evil demon (under the assumption that the latter beliefs are not warranted by, and cannot be acceptably reached from, purely what is given to us through introspection and a priori reflection.) It is worth noting that a second framework idea is moving the Moorean Dogmatist here as well. This is that there should at least be some cases in which it will be fully epistemically acceptable for one explicitly to reason in a way that tracks the structure of the warrants one has for a given belief, thereby arriving at that belief for the first time in a way that renders it fully epistemically acceptable.

It is important to be completely clear about the Moorean Dogmatist’s thesis at this juncture. A careful Moorean Dogmatist will hold that if one has *doubts* (whether warranted or unwarranted), or has reason to have doubts, about whether one is being deceived by an evil demon, or if one *suspects* that one is, then such reasoning cannot yield a doxastically justified belief in the conclusion of the reasoning. Likewise if one believes (with or without warrant) that one is not warranted in believing that one has hands on the basis of one’s visual experience. But, as Pryor puts it,

In the happy case where you neither *have* nor *have reason to have* the kinds of doubts the skeptic wants to induce, then the [warrant] your experiences give you for Moore’s premise (1) will be undefeated and

[rationally] unobstructed. Having that [warrant] for the premise *will* make Moore's conclusion more credible for you; and that justificatory relationship is one that you can rationally endorse in your reasoning (2004, 369).

The careful Dogmatist's thesis is thus this: if one considers the question of whether one is a disembodied spirit being deceived by an evil demon, starts out with no attitude at all – not doubt, tendency to believe, balanced credence, or suspension of judgment – about the issue, and starts with no background commitments about the world at all and no higher-order beliefs to the effect that one possesses defeaters for or is not warranted in believing any of the relevant beliefs, *then* it is possible in principle for one first to form a fully epistemically satisfactory belief about the external world on the basis of an immediate perceptual warrant, from there to infer that one is not being deceived by an evil demon, and thus to arrive for the first time at a fully epistemically acceptable belief that one is not being so deceived.^{vi}

This thesis is not established merely by the thesis that one can have immediate perceptual warrant for some beliefs about the world: the existence of immediate perceptual warrant does not entail or guarantee the epistemic satisfactoriness of the Moorean reasoning. To see this, consider how the responsibilist view sketched above would regard the Moorean reasoning. This view allows that a visual experience as of your hands provides you an immediate warrant for the belief that you have hands. However, this view also endorses the following principle:

When in the course of explicit, conscious deliberation or reasoning one bases a belief that P upon a particular warranting state or condition W, that

belief will not be *doxastically justified* unless for each possible disabling condition \square that one recognizes would prevent W from defeasibly telling in favor of the truth of P, one believes – if one considers the question at all – that it does not obtain *and* this latter belief is *doxastically justified as well*.

Of course, your being a disembodied spirit undergoing misleading visual experiences caused by an evil demon would be a *disabling condition* for your experience's providing warrant for you to believe pretty much anything about the world at all. So given this principle, if you recognize that this is so, then you cannot attain a doxastically justified belief in the truth of a proposition about the world around you by deliberately basing it upon your experience unless you have a doxastically justified belief that you are not such a disembodied spirit. Suppose, then, that you recognize that your being a disembodied spirit under an evil demon's sway would prevent your visual experience from telling in favor of the truth of the proposition that you have hands. You are in the position specified by the Dogmatist's thesis. You are deliberating about whether to believe, on the basis of your visual experience, that you have hands. Suppose that you do go ahead and form this belief on this basis. According to the responsibilist view defended here, the belief will not be responsibly held, since you do not yet believe that you are not a disembodied spirit under an evil demon's sway. (That latter belief is supposed to be arrived at only in the next stage in the reasoning.) Since the belief that you have hands would not be responsibly held under such circumstances, it also wouldn't be *doxastically justified*. And if you go on to infer from it that you are not a disembodied spirit under an evil demon's sway, that latter belief will not be doxastically justified

either. One cannot arrive at a doxastically justified belief by explicitly basing the belief upon another belief that is not doxastically justified. The resultant belief would be open to epistemic criticism.

So the responsibilist view defended here could allow immediate experiential warrants, but it would hold that the Moorean reasoning, if literally followed out, cannot *ever* enable one to arrive for the first time at a doxastically justified belief that one is not under an evil demon's sway. In order to yield a doxastically justified belief to this effect, one would already have to have a doxastically justified belief to this effect. Again, to focus attention on the key issue: if one literally followed out the Moorean reasoning under the imagined circumstances, there would be a moment, just before one formed the belief that one has hands, at which one's deliberative position would be fully represented like this, "I recognize that if I were being deceived by an evil demon, that would prevent my visual experience from telling in favor of the truth of the claim that I have hands, and as of yet I have no opinion whatsoever as to whether I am being deceived by an evil demon, but still, I conclude from my visual experience that I have hands." According to the view in question, that position is epistemically criticizable – it is epistemically irresponsible – and this is so even if one's visual experience gives one an immediate warrant to believe that one has hands.

I want to stress that this is *not* an argument against the Dogmatist thesis that there are immediate perceptual warrants. Rather, it is an argument that if one accepts a certain plausible view about what doxastic justification requires, then even if there are immediate perceptual warrants, one cannot utilize them to arrive through explicit deliberation at doxastically justified beliefs to the effect that recognized disabling conditions for those

warrants do not obtain. I should emphasize too that the claim that there are immediate warrants isn't playing any role here other than as a concession. One could reject the Moorean reasoning on the basis of responsibilist considerations even if one denied that there are any immediate warrants. (In that case, one would think the Moorean Dogmatist makes *two* mistakes.)

Many Dogmatists, such as Pryor, do not accept the reliabilist constraint on warrant that I appealed to in articulating and defending the responsibilist criticism of the Moorean reasoning. For this reason, they could reject the criticism offered in this section by rejecting part of its motivation. However, I did not mean to be offering an internal criticism that even a Dogmatist like Pryor would have to accept given the total package he offers. Rather, I meant to be articulating what I take to underlie our (pretheoretical) dissatisfaction with the kind of reasoning that Moorean Dogmatists endorse. As I see it, then, the ultimate question is this: which total package provides the best fit with our ordinary epistemic judgments and practice? I've urged that the reliabilist constraint on warrant fits well, and the total package is strengthened by the fact that this constraint can help explain responsibilist requirements that enable a plausible account of our pretheoretical resistance to the Dogmatist's reasoning.

Am I offering a charge of "transmission failure"?

According to a prominent line of criticism, arguments such as Moore 1-3 suffer from a failure of *warrant transmission* and that is why one cannot reasonably base a belief in Moore-3 on this inference (Wright, Davies). To say that this argument suffers from a failure of warrant to transmit is to say that even if one had warrant to believe

Moore-2 (based on Moore-1), that warrant does not transmit across the entailment to Moore-3 in such a way as to provide one with a warrant to believe Moore-3. The rough idea behind this charge has two parts: first, that it is constitutive of the kind of warrant one has for Moore-2 that one couldn't so much as have warrant for Moore-2 unless one had some warrant – other than any warrant provided by Moore-2 – to believe Moore-3; second, that because of this constraint, one's warrant to believe Moore-2 will not transmit across the inference from Moore-2 (based on Moore-1) to Moore-3.^{vii}

Taking this charge completely literally, and assuming the account of warrant presented here, the “responsibilist” objection presented above to Moore 1-3 is not a charge of transmission failure for warrant. For one thing, the first part of the charge of transmission failure would not be endorsed by this objection. The objection allows that visual experiences can provide *immediate warrants* for beliefs about the world, so it would not grant that one could not (as a constitutive matter) have the kind of warrant for Moore-2 that one has unless one also has some other warrant for Moore-3. Rather, the objection charges that one could not arrive through explicit deliberation at a doxastically justified belief in Moore-2 unless one had a doxastically justified belief in Moore-3.

A second point is relevant here. Talk of “warrant transmission” across inferences or through courses of reasoning is itself rather odd, given the account of warrant presented here. A Dogmatist might want to say that the Moorean reasoning “can be a way to acquire some warrant to believe Moore-3” (Pryor, MS, 7). But this doesn't seem to be quite right, strictly speaking. Even if one does not go through the reasoning, one has a warrant to believe Moore-3 in virtue of undergoing certain visual experiences. It is a *mediate* warrant – a warrant which one has only in virtue of having warrant to believe

certain supporting propositions – but it is a warrant all the same. Does this mean that reasoning in accordance with Moore 1-3 could be a way to acquire *a warranted belief* in Moore-3? Yes, it does. If you acquire a belief in Moore-3 in this way, then you will thereby acquire a warranted belief – that is, a belief for which you have warrant. But this does not mean that your belief will be epistemically satisfactory. After all, since you do have warrant to believe Moore-3 (a mediate warrant), *any* way in which you acquire a belief in Moore-3 will yield a warranted belief, in the sense of a belief for which you have warrant. The warrant thus doesn't “fail to transmit” in the Moorean reasoning because it isn't right to describe the warrant as something that could, or could not, *transmit*. Whether or not you go through the course of reasoning is irrelevant to the question of whether you have that warrant to believe Moore-3. (It might be suggested that we should read the claim about the acquisition of warrant as suggesting that the state or condition of *having gone through the course of reasoning* is itself the relevant warrant to believe Moore-3. But this would be a very different account of how one is supposed to wind up with an epistemically acceptable belief in Moore-3.)

The point here is a simple one: on the account of warrant presented here, warrants aren't things that get transmitted through acts of inference or courses of reasoning. They can perhaps be generated by going through processes of inference or courses of reasoning. But that is not a matter of a warrant transmitting from the premise to the conclusion.

It may be that talk of “warrant transmission” is simply a fanciful way of expressing the conjunction of two claims: a *closure* claim for the relevant warrants and an “in virtue of” claim identifying which warrant is antecedent of the other. If that is

what is meant, then we can understand talk of transmission-failure in two ways, as claiming a failure of closure under entailment, or as granting closure but denying the relevant “in virtue of” claim. Both claims have some plausibility regarding the warrants under discussion here. Take closure first. My visual experiences of my hands might be claimed not to provide any warrant at all – not even a mediate one – for the belief that two plus two equals four, even though there is the requisite reliable link and even though on many views of entailment “I have hands” entails “two plus two equals four.” Perhaps a similar claim could be made about the warrant-situation regarding my visual experiences of my hands and my belief that I am not being deceived by an evil demon. (Certain ways of understanding the reliability requirement in the proposed account of warrant may guarantee failures of warrant to be closed under entailment.) Second, one could grant the relevant closure claim but deny that it is *in virtue of* being perceptually warranted in believing that one has hands that one is warranted in believing that one is not being deceived by an evil demon. So far as I can see, the only way to make this charge stick is to claim that one could not have an experiential warrant to believe that one has hands unless one had an independent warrant to believe that one is not being deceived by an evil demon. If that were so, then closure would hold – whenever one has experiential warrant to believe one has hands, one will have warrant to believe that one is not being deceived – but it would not be in virtue of having experiential warrant to believe that one has hands that one will have that warrant to believe that one is not being deceived. Perhaps further complications could be added, such as proposing that two distinct sources of warrant for the latter belief will be in play in this sort of case, and one might then worry about how they are related. Perhaps one might find some additional

phenomenon in that detail that one would want to call “transmission failure.” But however those further developments go, it should be noted that any such charge arising in this way would depend upon the idea that the experiential warrant for one’s belief that one has hands is not immediate after all, but instead constitutively depends upon one’s having warrant to believe some other proposition. Whether any of these charges can be made to stick will depend upon the further development of a theory of warrant and further investigation of the relations amongst the warrants in play in this particular case.

The charge offered by the “responsibilist” view sketched here does not depend upon any such claims about the relations amongst the relevant warrants. Rather, the charge is that even though one has a mediate warrant to believe Moore-3, one cannot responsibly come to believe Moore-3 for the first time through a line of reasoning such as Moore 1-3. This is a charge about *acceptable courses of reasoning*. It commits the view sketched here to the following possibility: that one can *have* warrant to believe a particular proposition even if one cannot acquire a responsibly held, doxastically justified belief by explicitly reasoning in a way that tracks the structure of the warrant and consciously basing belief in the proposition upon that warranting state or condition. Of course, there are some instances in which one obviously cannot do this, such as the case in which one *has* warrant to believe p, but has no attitude (not even dispositionally) as to whether the warranting state or condition tells in favor of the truth of p. In that case, deliberating in accordance with the structure of the warrant one has, thereby attempting to base one’s belief that p upon that warranting state or condition, will not yield a fully epistemically acceptable belief that p, at least not in a mature adult. What the view sketched here is committed to, though, is something different: the existence of mediate

warrants which are such that it *is not possible* for an ideal rational agent to arrive at a fully epistemically satisfactory, doxastically justified belief by inferring in a way that tracks their structure. This is a surprising result. But I don't think that it is a strike against the view. Consider, for instance the proposition that one currently has no occurrent second-order-beliefs. That's a straightforward example of a proposition which someone could have a warrant for believing but which is such that the person *can't* reasonably come to believe it by reasoning on the basis of that warrant, though the failure in this case is admittedly rather different than the failure charged in the case of the Moorean reasoning.^{viii}

Is it apt to describe the failing ascribed to Moore 1-3 as a failing of *doxastic justification* to transmit? I'm not sure. The real problem is simply this, call it what you like: in the envisioned circumstances, one *is not doxastically justified in believing Moore-2 by basing it on one's visual experience*. As a consequence, one is not doxastically justified in believing Moore-3, any more than one would be in believing *any* conclusion that one might draw from Moore-2, since one cannot acquire a doxastically justified belief by explicitly drawing an inference from a belief which is not doxastically justified.

Suppose that we modify the situation slightly, so that one *is* doxastically justified in accepting Moore-3 at the stage in the deliberation just before one accepts Moore-2. Would the reasoning then exhibit a failure of doxastic justification to transmit through an inference? In such a case, one would acquire a doxastically justified belief in Moore-2. And one would already have a doxastically justified belief in Moore-3. Suppose, then, that one went on to try to base one's belief in Moore-3 on one's belief in Moore-2. We

might want to say that at the end of this procedure one's belief in Moore-3 remains doxastically justified. Or we might want to say that it doesn't because this procedure renders one's belief in Moore-3 (at the end) epistemically criticizable. But so far as I can see, not much (if anything) turns on this issue. Either way, we can agree that *something* is going wrong.

The Upshot for "Moorean Dogmatism"

I have argued that it is possible – and perhaps desirable – to combine commitment to the existence of immediate perceptual warrants with certain requirements pertaining to epistemic responsibility. The consequence is a view which denies the following skeptical principle:

In order to have an experiential warrant to believe anything about the world around one, one must have an independent warrant for believing that one is not a disembodied spirit being given misleading hallucinatory experiences by an evil demon.

But the resulting view also holds that it is not possible to utilize the Moorean reasoning to arrive for the first time at a doxastically justified belief in that reasoning's conclusion. This does not mean that this view would be forced to say that we cannot be doxastically justified in believing that we are not victims of an evil demon's deceptions; only that if we are, it will not be by virtue of explicitly arriving at this belief via this sort of reasoning.

Still, the resultant view would be vulnerable to a familiar form of skeptical argument. Here's how. It might be said that considerations of epistemic responsibility dictate that a mature rational agent cannot acceptably believe anything at all about the

world on the basis of sensory experience unless she or he has an *independently supported* belief that she or he is not a disembodied spirit being deceived by an evil demon. This is to demand a warrant for this belief that does not constitutively depend – whether immediately or mediately – upon experiential warrants to believe things about the world. It is natural to think that if this requirement is correct, then one’s experientially-based beliefs about the world will not be doxastically justified unless this independently supported belief that one is not being deceived by an evil demon is doxastically justified. So consider the following principle:

In order to be doxastically justified in believing anything about the world on the basis of sensory experience, one must believe that one is not a disembodied spirit being deceived by an evil demon, and this belief must be doxastically justified without being based upon sensory experience itself or upon anything one believes upon the basis of sensory experience (or, more generally, it must be doxastically justified in a way that does not constitutively depend upon sensory experience itself or upon one’s having any doxastically justified perceptual beliefs; it must be *independently* doxastically justified).

If one cannot – within the constraints of this requirement – have a doxastically justified beliefs that one is not being deceived by an evil demon, then acceptance of this requirement commits one to external world skepticism. The view of doxastic justification sketched in this paper does not force acceptance of this principle, but it is compatible with it. And this points out a very important lesson: the “Dogmatist” view

that there are immediate perceptual warrants does not defeat a very familiar form of skeptical argument. More is needed.

Two broad options present themselves. The first is to accept this principle, but to supplement the account of immediate perceptual warrant with an explanation of how we are non-experientially warranted in believing that we are not disembodied spirits being deceived by an evil demon. The history of our subject should deter us from taking that road, or at least should lead us to reserve it as the path of last resort.

The second option is to reject this principle. Here again two broad options present themselves.

The first is to combine the claim that there are immediate perceptual warrants with the claim that there can be *immediate experiential doxastic justification*, that is, cases in which a belief is doxastically justified on the basis of experience in a way that does not constitutively depend upon one's having any other doxastically justified beliefs. This claim can be reconciled with the requirements on epistemic responsibility utilized in this paper.^{ix} However, I'm inclined to think that for mature believers at least, the demands of epistemic responsibility militate against the possibility of immediate doxastic justification, roughly because they require that in every case, one must epistemically acceptably take or treat (or be prepared to take or treat) something as telling in favor of the truth of the belief – which demands, in turn, that one have further doxastically justified beliefs.

For this reason, I think that it is important – especially for those of us who are drawn to these sorts of requirements stemming from epistemic responsibility – to notice a second option: there are ways of denying this skeptical requirement *without* claiming that

there can be immediate doxastic justification. The key is to grant that in order to be doxastically justified in believing anything on the basis of sensory experience, one must have a doxastically justified belief that one is not a disembodied spirit being deceived by an evil demon, but to deny that this latter belief must be doxastically justified in a way that does not constitutively depend upon having any other justified beliefs about the world. However, the only way to see the possibility of that option is give up the assumption, central to much theorizing about these matters, that if we have any doxastically justified beliefs about the world at all, then we should be able to reconstruct how an (ideal) epistemic subject could – without assuming any claims about the external world at the outset – explicitly reason or deliberate her way to conclusions about the world, making only acceptable moves at each step and thereby acquiring doxastically justified beliefs about the world.

ⁱ See my Synthese 2008.

ⁱⁱ It should be acknowledged that my use of the term “defeater” here diverges somewhat from the usage which is now somewhat standard, according to which the term “defeater” refers to a belief or other introspectively-available internal state. To some extent this is a merely verbal issue. But insofar as one thinks that real-world, non-internally-available states or conditions can constitute defeasible reasons, it will be natural to think that such states or conditions can *defeat* the support provided by such reasons. I suspect that the limitation of the term “defeater” to introspectively-available internal states is rooted in a certain conception of *reasons* as introspectively-available internal states.

ⁱⁱⁱ The line between *disabling conditions* and *defeaters* may not be a sharp one. This is one place where thinking about warrants in the way I’m suggesting here can run into something like the generality problem for reliabilism. I’m not sure yet what to say about this issue.

^{iv} REF: Pryor

^v Cf., Wright

^{vi} In considering this thesis, we are of course supposed to bracket any concerns pertaining to the conditions for possessing contentful beliefs about the world at all.

^{vii} It is noteworthy that on this rough characterization of the idea, the charge of warrant-transmission failure is parasitic on a denial that we have immediate perceptual warrant for beliefs about the world. It is a tricky question whether there is a version of the charge that does not assume the denial of immediate perceptual warrant. For discussion, see [].

^{viii} This example comes from Juan Comesaña. He isn't to be held responsible for my use of it.

^{ix} In fact, it could even be reconciled with the claim that one cannot be doxastically justified in holding a belief in virtue of basing it upon an adequate ground unless one has a doxastically justified belief that the ground supports the truth of that belief. All one would have to do is to hold that there can be cases in which one can be immediately doxastically justified in holding a belief without basing it upon any grounds.